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Build America Bonds (BABs) are a new form of municipal financing introduced in 2009.  Investors
in BAB municipal bonds receive interest payments that are taxable, but issuers receive a subsidy from
the U.S. Treasury.  The BAB program has succeeded in lowering the cost of funding for state and
local governments with BAB issuers obtaining finance 54 basis points lower, on average, compared
to issuing regular municipal bonds.  For institutional investors, BAB issue yields are 116 basis points
higher than comparable Treasuries and 88 basis points higher than comparable highly rated corporate
bonds.  For individual investors, BABs have lower yields than regular municipal bonds.  Thus, on
average the Federal government subsidy disadvantages individual U.S. taxpayers, who are the main
holders of municipal bonds, and benefits new entrants in the municipal bond market.
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Build America Bonds (BABs) were introduced by the federal government as part of the Amer-
ican Recovery and Reinvestment Act signed into law by President Obama on February 17,
2009.1 The Build America Bond program is designed to help state and local governments pur-
sue various capital projects such as the construction of public buildings, schools, roads, energy
projects, public utilities, and other public infrastructure projects. The ﬁrst BAB was issued by
the University of Virginia with an award date of April 15, 2009 and a dated date of April 22,
2009. By the end of December 2009, around $63.4 billion of BABs have been issued compared
with $332.2 billion of regular municipal bonds. Thus, BABs represent 16% of all municipal
ﬁnance raised during this period.
Funding for states and local governments is traditionally done through regular municipal
bond issues, where investors receive tax-exempt coupon interest payments from municipal is-
suers.2 Since traditional municipal bonds provide tax-exempt income, municipal bonds are
attractive investments for individuals and, not surprisingly, over two-thirds of municipal bonds
are held by individuals (see Ang, Bhansali and Xing, 2010). Consequently, tax-exempt munic-
ipal bond yields have, on average, been lower than taxable Treasury and corporate bond yields
(see, among others, Green, 1993).3
Under the BAB program, municipalities issue bonds with taxable coupon payments, but
they receive a subsidy from the federal government to offset their borrowing costs.4 This sub-
1 This is also commonly known as the “Stimulus Bill.” Details of the BAB program are available at the Treasury
website at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg80.htm
2 There are some bonds issued by municipalities that are taxable as they do not meet requirements that the bond
proceeds provide a signiﬁcant beneﬁt to the general public. Certain municipal bonds payments are also subject
to the Alternative Minimum Tax. For the majority of municipal bond issues, investors receive interest payments
exempt from Federal income tax.
3 However, in the aftermath of the recent ﬁnancial crisis, which has substantially impaired the ﬁnances of many
municipal issuers, municipal bond yields have often been higher than equivalent maturity Treasury yields. Another
reason for this reversal is the greater liquidity demand of Treasuries by investors not able to take advantage of the
tax exemptions of municipal bonds.
4 There is a second, much less common type of of BAB where BAB holders receive a tax credit from the federal
government equal to 35% of the bond each year (or 45% in certain cases). We do not analyze this type of BAB.
1sidy enables state and municipal governments to tap additional sources of capital other than
individuals. BABs can only be issued during 2009 and 2010, but the subsidy is for the life of
the BABs.
The subsidy is set at 35% of the BAB coupon, which is currently the same as the highest
marginal federal income tax rate and the highest marginal corporate income tax rate. For exam-
ple, suppose a state issues a BAB with a 5% taxable interest rate. The United States Treasury
pays the state government 0.35 × 0.05 = 1.75% making the state government’s net borrowing
cost 3.25% on a bond that pays a 5% coupon. An investor receiving the 5% coupon is subject
to taxes: an individual in the highest Federal marginal income tax rate holding the BAB would
receive (1 − 0.35) × 0.05 = 3.25% net of Federal taxes while a non-taxable entity such as a
pension fund would receive the full 5% coupon. Hence, from the perspective of an investor, the
BAB is a special type of a regular taxable bond.
Suppose the state government issued a regular municipal bond at 3.25%. This is the same
out-of-pocket cost as the BAB which carries a 5% coupon. An individual investor buying the
regular municipal bond receives the full 3.25% and pays no tax. In this case, the individual
investor is indifferent between the BAB and a regular municipal bond. However, in practice
taxable interest rates tend to be, on average, higher than tax-exempt yields. This makes regular
municipal bonds unattractive investments for pension funds, foreign investors, and investors in
low tax brackets. Since BABs are taxable, the BAB program theoretically enlarges the market
for municipal issuers and enables a much broader group of investors to ﬁnance state and local
government projects.
In this article we examine if opening up the municipal bond market to a a larger clientele has
lowered the cost of borrowing for state and local governments. Since the subsidy is provided
by the Federal government, and thus ultimately U.S. taxpayers, we also compare the prices of
This second type is rare because in order to take advantage of the tax credit, the BAB investor must have U.S.
taxable income, which is not the case for tax-exempt investors such as pension plans and many foreign investors.
We also do not consider other types of issuance under this program, which are the “Qualiﬁed School Construction
Bonds” or “Qualiﬁed Zone Academy Bonds.”
2BABs relative to traditional municipal markets, Treasury bonds, and high credit quality corpo-
rate bonds. Finally, we investigate if individuals receive any beneﬁt from holding BABs relative
to regular municipal bonds and estimate the role of the Federal subsidy in determining the value
of BABs.5 In particular, we discuss the transfer issues regarding the U.S. Treasury payments
from individual taxpayers to new entrants in the municipal bond market. To our knowledge, our
paper is the ﬁrst formal analysis of the BAB market not produced by the Federal government.6
2 BABs and Tax-Exempt Municipal Bonds
Our data are obtained from Bloomberg and include all 6,177 BABs (CUSIPs) issued during
2009 as Direct Pay BABs. Table 1 reports summary statistics of the BABs over April to De-
cember 2009 and compares the issuance of BABs with the issuance of regular municipal bonds.
Over this period 6,177 BAB securities were issued carrying distinct CUSIPS representing 663
unique issuers. The amount of local and state government ﬁnance raised in 2009 through BABs
totals $63.4 billion.
To compare the BAB issuance with regular municipal issues, we collect all municipal bond
issues occurring between April and December 2009 which have subsequent secondary market
trades reported by the MSRB. There were 95,233 regular tax-exempt municipal bonds issued
totaling $332.2 billion. Municipal bonds tend to be much smaller, with an average issue size
of $3.5 million, compared to BABs with an average issue size of $10.2 million. Thus, BABs
are more attractive to institutions because of their larger issue size. In our analysis we take
only straight bonds to avoid potentially complex computations involved in valuing embedded
5 We are implicitly assuming that the issuer does not have the ability to re-ﬁnance or pre-refund existing tax-
exempt or BABs into each other and thus “arbitrage” the beneﬁts of the subsidy. Generally, the tax code prevents
such arbitrage. The ability to reﬁnance BABs into other BABs is being considered in policy circles.
6 The U.S. Treasury has issued a report, Treasury Analysis of Build America Bonds and Issuer Net Borrowing
Costs, showing that the BAB program has reduced borrowing costs of states and municipalities, consistent with our
ﬁndings. However, their analysis uses linear ﬁxed effect regressions on yields, which are by deﬁnition non-linear
functions of cashﬂows. We avoid any linearizations, deal with truly comparable BABs issued in other conventional
bond markets, and handle risk consistently by discounting by different zero-coupon yield curves. The Treasury
report also does not compare BABs to Treasuries and corporate bond markets.
3options. Straight bonds constitute 39% of all BABs and 60% of all regular municipal securities.
Table 1 also reports information on the maturities of BABs and municipal bonds. BABs
tend to have longer maturities than regular municipal bonds. While 54% of BABs have longer
maturities than 10 years, only 36% of regular municipal bonds have similar maturities. S&P
credit ratings on BABs are similar to the ratings on regular municipals with the majority of all
issues rated AA or AAA.
3 Comparing BABs with Other Bond Markets
We compare the yield on BABs with more traditional debt by comparing the BAB issue yield
with hypothetical yields computed using different discount rates. The motivation is as follows.
In equilibrium, the price of any security is given by summing a series of discounted expected
cashﬂows. The yield is a (non-linear) transformation of that price. The discount rate reﬂects
the risk associated with the cashﬂow stream. Following Dufﬁe and Singleton (1999), we can
transform the risk of default into the discount rate and treat the cashﬂow stream to be default-
free. That is, suppose the cashﬂows of the BAB are given by CFt at time t. Then, we can value





(1 + rt+i/2)i, (1)
where we use semi-annual compounding so N is the maturity of the bond in years and rt+i is
the zero-coupon rate from t to t + i in annualized terms. This formula treats the cashﬂow as
default-free because the risk of default is absorbed by the discount rate.7
7 This valuation framework is very general; Dufﬁe and Singleton (1999) show that the discount rate captures
default risk even when the default risk is time varying as long as the loss given default does not depend on the size
of the defaultable claim at the time of default.
4We consider three sets of discount rates:8
1. Municipal Bonds
If the BAB cashﬂows have the same default rate as a regular municipal bond, then we can
discount using municipal bond discount rates. In this case, we construct municipal bond
zero curves taking only interdealer trades of fully tax-exempt bonds with S&P ratings of
A and above following Ang, Bhansali and Xing (2010).
2. Treasuries
This is an extreme assumption as it speciﬁes that BABs carry the same risk as the Federal
government. We take zero coupon Treasury yields from the Federal Reserve constructed
following G¨ urkaynak, Sack and Wright (2007).
3. Swaps
In this case, we assume BABs to carry the same credit risk as AA-rated ﬁnancial institu-
tions. We obtain swap zeros from Bloomberg.
In each case, we express the discounted BAB cashﬂows as a yield. The yield obtained
using the municipal zero curve can be interpreted as the yield the BAB issuer would receive if
a bond with equivalent cashﬂows was issued in the regular municipal bond market instead of as
a BAB. Similarly, if the U.S. Treasury issued a bond with the same cashﬂows as the BAB, the
implied Treasury yield would be the effective yield earned by an investor buying the comparable
Treasury security. Finally, if an equivalent corporate bond were issued with the same cashﬂows
astheBABandtheinvestorpurchasedthisequivalentcorporatebond, hewouldearntheimplied
yield obtained from discounting using the swap curve. Thus, each of the yields implied by the
different sets of discount rates represent the price of a bond with the same cashﬂows as the BAB
issued in different markets.
8 We do not consider corporate bond discount rates other than swaps or rates implied by CDS because we are
unable to obtain zero-coupon curves for these types of securities.
5Since the natural comparison of BABs is the traditional municipal market which is exempt
from tax, we compute tax-adjusted yields. This is done using methods similar to Ang, Bhansali
and Xing (2010). We take the viewpoint of an individual investor subject to a 35% tax rate held
constant for the life of the bond. For example, for a par bond, the coupon cashﬂows net-of-tax
are 65% of the original coupon. We compute an after-tax Treasury and after-tax swap yield
discounting the net-of-tax cashﬂows received by the individual investor.
The issue yield of the BAB is not the borrowing cost to the issuer because the local or state
government receives a 35% subsidy from the U.S. Treasury. We compute the effective issuer
yield by discounting the original bond coupons multiplied by 65%, which is the actual coupon
paid by the issuer when applying the municipal discount rates. Note that this is the same yield
earned by an individual investor assuming the BAB carries the same default risk as a regular
municipal bond. However, this effective yield does not include underwriting fees which are not
available. Anecdotal evidence suggests underwriting fees on BABs are signiﬁcantly higher than
regular municipal issues.9
We summarize these deﬁnitions in Table 2.
4 Results
Table 3 presents the main results and compares the yields on BABs with the implied yields
representing equivalent securities issued in other conventional bond markets. The average orig-
inal issue yield of BABs in 2009 is 3.69%. It should be noted that there is well-known large
heterogeneity in municipal market yields in general and the BAB market is no exception. The
10th and 90th percentile original BAB issue yields are 2.00% and 5.10%, respectively. We do
not analyze this dispersion as we are interested in average level effects. Note that the implied
municipal, Treasury, and swap yields we compute preserve their rankings no matter what the
original BAB issue yields are because all the zero yield curves are upward sloping over our
sample. Thus, our results on the yields of BABs relative to other markets are unaffected by the
9 See Dugan, I. J., “Build America Pays Off on Wall Street,” Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2010.
6dispersion.
Because of the Federal subsidy, the issuing entity does not pay the original issue yield.
The effective yield to the issuer is 2.32%, on average, which is lower than the average BAB
raw issue yield of 3.69% because 35% of the coupon payments are being made by the Federal
government. This is the same after-tax yield, on average, an individual investor would earn
buying BABs.
We compare the BAB effective issuer yield with the comparable regular municipal yield in
the next line of Table 3. If local and state governments had issued equivalent municipal bonds
instead of BABs, their ﬁnancing rates would rise from 2.32% to 2.86%, a difference of 54 basis
points per year. In fact, this is likely an understatement because the regular municipal yield is
lower than what it otherwise would have been had the regular municipal market been forced to
absorb the extra BAB issuance. Thus, the Obama stimulus package has succeeded in reducing
the ﬁnancing costs of local and state governments in funding infrastructure projects.
From an individual investor point of view, however, BABs have lower yields than regular
municipal bonds. Buying a regular municipal bond yields 2.86%, which is higher than purchas-
ing a BAB and receiving an after-tax yield of 2.32% (the same as the effective issuer yield).
Thus, for individuals municipal bonds dominate BABs, on average. If the same clientele who
regularly hold municipal bonds purchased the whole BAB issuance, individual investors would
have received the higher yields of municipal bonds. In this light, the BAB program can be in-
terpreted as a wealth transfer from the natural holders of municipal bonds, who are individual
U.S. taxpayers, to corporations, pension funds, and foreign investors not subject to individual
U.S. income taxes.
The next line in Table 3 compares BAB yields with Treasuries. For a tax-exempt entity such
as an endowment, pension fund, or some foreign investors, BABs have higher yields compared
to holding Treasuries. If equivalent Treasury securities were issued with the same cashﬂows as
the BABs, these securities would yield 2.53%, on average. BABs yield 3.69%, on average, and
dominate Treasuries, but some of the extra 116 basis points per year represents compensation
7for bearing municipal risk rather than risk-free Treasuries. However, the credit risk in municipal
issues, especially at the local government and state level, has been small.10
The relevant yield for an individual purchasing the equivalent Treasury bonds is 1.31% on
an after-tax basis. For the individual investor, purchasing BABs yields 2.32%, on average, after
taxes, which is a difference of 101 basis points. Again, a small part of this spread represents
compensation for increased default risk. But, if BABs carry the same risk as regular municipal
bonds, the yields on municipal bonds are higher than BABs for individual investors in the 35%
tax bracket.
The next two lines of Table 3 report the equivalent swap yields and after-tax swap yields.
For tax-exempt institutions and assuming that that BABs have the same, or better, credit risk as
highly rated ﬁnancial institutions, BABs have higher yields than high-grade corporate bonds:
theimpliedyieldis2.81%onequivalentBABcashﬂowsissuedintheswapmarketversus3.69%
for straight BABs. For individuals, after-tax swap yields are also dominated by BABs.
We report the percentage of the BAB issue price that is due to the Federal subsidy in the
last line of Table 3. This is computed as the sum of the present value of the coupon stream
multiplied by 35%, which is the amount paid by the Federal government, divided by the issue
price. The Federal subsidy contributes 7.47%, on average, to the total value of BABs.
Finally, we also report the average implied yields each month from May to December 2009.
(We exclude April as there is only one BAB issue during that month.) This shows that the
corresponding rankings of the yields of BABs relative to other investments is very stable. The
implied BAB yields are not very volatile because interest rates have not exhibited much varia-
tion during the sample period.
There are at least two reasons why BABs have lower after-tax yields relative to regular
municipal bonds. One is that the BAB program has succeeded in opening up the municipal
market to non-taxable and other non-traditional investors. Enhanced liquidity of BABs relative
to regular municipal bonds would make BABs less risky and hence holders of BABs require
10 See, for example, The U.S. Municipal Bond Rating Scale: Mapping to the Global Rating Scale And Assigning
Global Scale Ratings to Municipal Obligations, 2007, Moody’s Investors Service.
8lower after-tax yields compared to municipal bonds. We will explore this avenue in future
research.11 Consistent with a liquidity explanation is the fact that BABs are issued at higher
rawyieldsthantheimpliedswapandTreasuryyields, withcorporatebondandTreasurymarkets
presumably being more liquid than BABs.
A second potential reason why regular municipal bonds have higher yields than after-tax,
or effective, BAB yields is the outstanding puzzle that long municipal yields are “too high”
relative to taxable yields, that is the term structure is generally steeper for municipal bonds
than for Treasuries (see Green, 1993; Chalmers, 1998). In Table 4, we report a breakdown of
the various implied BAB yields by maturity.12 Breaking down the yields by maturity severely
reduces the number of observations, particularly at the long-end of the yield curve with only
seven observations, so our results have to be interpreted with caution.
The last column of Table 4 shows that the spread between implied municipal and effective
BAB yields increases from 0.49% to 0.78% moving from maturities less than ﬁve years to
maturities greater than 15 years, respectively. This is evidence that the municipal maturity
effect plays a role. Thus, the lower ﬁnancing costs of BABs for issuers comes partly from the
original municipal yield curve being much steeper than the taxable yield curve. Comparing
only long- versus short-maturity rates within each market, BABs have relatively small spreads
for long-dated versus short-dated borrowing. The slope of the implied municipal and implied
Treasury curves are very similar, at 2.56% and 2.68%, respectively. The slope of the effective
BAB yield curve is 2.23%, lower than the slopes of the implied municipal and Treasury curves.
But, the original BABs have the most pronounced upward-sloping yield with a slope of 3.42%.
11 Measuring liquidity in municipal bond markets is difﬁcult because the entire municipal bond market is ef-
fectively illiquid compared to Treasury and equity markets (see, for example, Harris and Piwowar, 2006; Green,
HolliﬁeldandSch¨ urhoff, 2007). Sincetheholdersofmunicipalbondsarenotknown, itisimpossibletodirectlytest
the ostensible purpose of the stimulus bill, that the municipal bond market has been opened up to non-individual
investors through the BAB program.
12 The municipal maturity puzzle is seen in Table 4 by the fact that the ratio of implied municipal to implied
Treasury yields is 2.080/1.5 1 1=1 .38 for maturities <5 years and 4.641/4.188 = 1.11 for maturities >15 years.
95 Conclusion
We analyze the prices of Build America Bonds (BABs) issued in 2009 under the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. The BAB program is designed to broaden the clientele
holding municipal debt and lower the borrowing cost of local and state governments funding
capital and infrastructure projects. We ﬁnd that this goal has been met: ignoring underwriting
fees, local and state governments were able to obtain ﬁnancing 54 basis points, on average,
cheaper than issuing in the regular municipal bond market.
For tax-exempt institutions such as endowments, pension funds, and foreign investors not
subject to U.S. income tax, BABs have original issue yields higher than regular tax-exempt
municipal bonds. For institutional investors, BAB yields are 116 basis points higher than com-
parable Treasuries and 88 basis points higher than comparable highly rated corporate bonds.
However, for individual investors subject to the highest 35% marginal income tax rate, BABs
have lower yields compared to regular municipal bonds. This implies that the subsidies from
the Federal government to local and state governments under the BAB program have accrued to
new entrants in the municipal bond market and have not, on average, beneﬁted individual U.S.
taxpayers.
Under current law, BABs can only be issued in 2009 and 2010, but there is current dis-
cussion of extending the BAB program in various forms. Given the need for large continued
public ﬁnancing at the local and state government levels, our ﬁndings play an important role in
evaluating the BAB program and the attractiveness of BABs compared to more traditional bond
markets for institutions and individual investors.
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11Table 1: BAB and Regular Municipal Issues Apr-Dec 2009
BAB Issues Regular Municipal Issues
Number Proportion Number Proportion
Straight Bonds 2,417 39.1% 56,894 59.7%
Bonds with Option Features 3,760 60.9% 38,339 40.3%
Total Bonds 6,177 95,233
Total Issue Size $63.4 bil $332.2 bil
Average Issue Size $10.2 mil $3.5 mil
Maturity at Issue
≤5yrs 1,085 17.6% 31,425 33.0%
5-10yrs 1,711 27.7% 30,130 31.6%
10-20yrs 2,717 44.0% 28,303 29.7%
>20yrs 664 10.9% 5,375 5.6%
S&P Initial Rating
AAA 1,262 20.4% 25,306 26.6%
AA 2,631 42.6% 29,549 31.0%
A 603 9.8% 9,164 9.6%
BBB and Below 9 0.1% 1,822 1.9%
Not Rated 1,672 27.1% 29,392 30.9%
12Table 2: Yield Deﬁnitions
Original Issue Yield Yield of the BAB at issue.
Effective Issuer Yield
Yield computed using the municipal curve taking 65% of the
original BAB cashﬂows. This is the effective yield the local
or state government is paying on the BAB. It is also the same
as the after-tax yield an investor earns buying the BAB.
Implied Municipal Yield
Yield computed using the municipal curve. This is the yield
if a regular municipal bond were purchased with the same
cashﬂows as the BAB.
Implied Treasury Yield
Yield computed using the Treasury curve. This is the yield if
a Treasury bond were purchased with the same cashﬂows as
the BAB.
Implied After-Tax Treasury Yield
Yield computed taking 65% of the original BAB cashﬂows
and discounting using the Treasury curve. This is the after-
tax yield earned by an individual investor buying a Treasury
bond with the same cashﬂows as the BAB.
Implied Swap Yield
Yield computed using the swap curve. This is the yield if
a corporate bond rated above AA were purchased with the
same cashﬂows as the BAB.
Implied After-Tax Swap Yield
Yield computed taking 65% of the original BAB cashﬂows
and discounting using the swap curve. This is the after-tax
yield earned by an individual investor buying a highly rated





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































14Table 4: Implied Yields by Maturity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (3)–(2)
Original Effective Municipal
Issue Issue Municipal Treasury Swap – Effective No Obs
<5 Years 2.595 1.591 2.080 1.511 2.013 0.490 861
5-10 Years 4.390 2.779 3.350 3.196 3.343 0.571 1135
10-15 Years 5.203 3.320 3.915 3.857 3.746 0.595 87
>15 Years 6.019 3.857 4.641 4.188 3.994 0.783 7
>15 Years 3.424 2.226 2.561 2.677 1.981 0.293
minus <5 Years
15